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California parallel monitoring of DRE's finds they performed with 100% accuracy

Secretary of State Kevin Shelley's elaborate parallel monitoring project to test the accuracy of five direct recording election (DRE) voting systems in use during the March, primary election concluded that all five performed with 100% accuracy.

The testers, R&G Associates, described the program results as a 'snapshot' of a specific election day. They added, "Thus the valueof the results is limited to the March 2, 2004election day." Moreover, R&G Associates warned that "there are forms of malicious code that could affect the accuracy of a voting system that would not be detected by federal, state, local or parallel testing."

The testers on election day checked two DRE units in each of eight counties, including all four counties that used the Diebold TSx voting system. In addition, Diebold TS, ES&S, iVotronic, Hart eSlate, and Sequoia AVC Edge voting systems were tested in one county each. The machines, after having been prepared for the election in a precinct, had been selected and segregated. They were not used by voters on that day.

For each county, 101 test scripts were developed. All counties, contest participants, voter demographics, script layouts and contents, and monitoring results were entered into a database. The database managed dozens of contests, over 250 contest participants, instructions for five different types of DRE equipment, and approximately 4,300 test voter selections from over 800 test scripts.

Test teams followed a specific test schedule that identified set times of executing 101 test scripts on each DRE unit. The schedule provided for 9.25 hours testing ove a 14-hour period. All testing was video recorded.

Researchers analyzed the data and reconciled differences from actual to expected results. The analysis included a review of the Discrepancy Reports for all counties and the videotapes, as necessary, to determine the source of all discrepancies. Discrepancies invariably proved to be tester errors rather than voting machine errors. The Parallel Monitoring Summary Report is available in its entirety on the Secretary of State's website: www.ss.ca.us.